After months of negotiations, the United States and Ukraine have finally signed their long-awaited so-called minerals deal on April 30. The agreement establishes a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund “for the long-term reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine, in response to the large-scale destruction caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and in pursuit of a peaceful, sovereign, and resilient Ukraine.” This is an unusually unequivocal stance regarding Russian responsibility given US President Donald Trump’s allegation at a press conference on February 18 that Ukraine had started the war.
A statement released by the US Treasury after the conclusion of the deal went a step further, noting that the “agreement signals clearly to Russia that the Trump Administration is committed to a peace process centred on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.”
As part of the negotiations, Kyiv managed to exclude from the agreement any recognition of past US assistance as part of Washington’s contribution to the fund. Mr Trump initially saw the minerals deal as a way to make Ukraine ‘reimburse’ the US for past military assistance. Questionable a premise as this was to begin with, it was made worse by Washington’s completely fictional $500 billion price tag attached to the demand—around four times what the US had actually provided since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Instead, only future military assistance will count as a US contribution toward the fund.
The terms of the deal also acknowledge Ukraine’s sovereignty over its natural resources. Hence, the agreement does not give Ukraine’s minerals to the US but includes provisions for the US to purchase mineral resources and to benefit from investment in their extraction.
The fact that Washington and Kyiv managed to agree on final terms —despite last-minute uncertainties—is in itself remarkable.
The joint exploration of Ukraine’s resources after the end of the war was one of five points in the victory plan presented by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on October 16, 2024. While Mr Trump had already signalled an interest in such a deal when he and Mr Zelenskyy met in New York at the end of September, the first concrete proposal presented by Washington to Kyiv in early February was rejected by Ukraine. And after the very public falling-out between Mr Zelenskyy and Mr Trump at the White House on February 28, it looked like the Ukrainian president had gambled away his country’s future.
What changed most in the two months since seems to be Mr Trump’s calculus about how he can live up to his campaign promise—and most likely sincerely held belief—that he will and must end the war against Ukraine.
No matter how significant American concessions appeared to be, Mr Trump’s counterpart in Moscow, Vladimir Putin, refused to agree even to a ceasefire. And Mr Putin’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reiterated Russia’s insistence on its maximalist demands for a peace agreement, including the full international recognition of all illegally annexed Ukrainian territories, as recently as April 28.
After an apparently very productive 15-minute meeting with Mr Zelenskyy in the Vatican before the funeral of Pope Francis, Mr Trump now seems to acknowledge that this is unacceptable to Ukraine and its European partners and that he needs to increase pressure on Mr Putin to get a deal done.
All of this indicates that Ukraine is now in a much stronger position than it has ever been since Mr Trump returned to the White House for a second term in January, 2025.
But this will not necessarily translate imminently into a ceasefire or pave the way towards meaningful negotiations of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
Mr Putin appears to remain committed to victory in Ukraine. Despite heavy casualties, Russian forces continue to make gains on the battlefield inside Ukraine and have all but eliminated Kyiv’s hold on territory in the Kursk and Belgorod regions inside Russia.
This is unlikely to change unless Mr Trump follows through on his threats of heavier sanctions against Russia and increases military support for Ukraine. There were some signs of the latter, at least, with the White House approving sales of military equipment to Ukraine worth $50 million shortly after the minerals deal was concluded.
Ukraine’s enthusiasm for the minerals deal is therefore understandable, but may still turn out to be misplaced.
One key demand by Kyiv—that formal US security guarantees be baked into the deal—has clearly not materialised. There is a certain logic to US treasury secretary Scott Bessent’s claim—first put forward in February 2025—that “an economic partnership would lay the foundations for a durable peace by sending a clear signal to … the government of Russia about the importance of Ukraine’s future sovereignty and success to the US.” However, it does not constitute the formal security guarantee required to credibly deter Russia from any renewed aggression. And without that, a future Ukrainian government might yet again find itself in a situation similar to February 2022 when, despite the presence of many American and European investors in Ukraine, the western response fell short of putting boots on the ground.
Without a ceasefire in place or a peace agreement on the horizon, insisting on an iron-clad American security guarantee was unlikely to be a winning strategy. It seems clear now that Mr Zelenskyy realised this just in time. This shift enabled him and his team to finalise the minerals deal with Mr Trump. This may not have brought Kyiv closer to the just and durable peace that Ukraine and its people deserve, but it has kept Ukraine—and its European allies—in the game for now and ensured continued US commitment not just in the war but also to a post-war future.
Buying time is a risky strategy for Ukraine when Russia still has momentum behind its campaign on the battlefield. It might, however, be a winning strategy to let Mr Trump realise that putting pressure on Mr Putin, rather than making concessions to him, is the key to unlocking the peace deal that has so far eluded him.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on May 7, 2025.
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