The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House on February 28, 2025, has not gone to plan. There were extraordinary scenes as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, accusing him of “gambling with world war three” — a familiar Russian talking point.
“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. His vice-president, JD Vance, also got in on the act, blaming the Ukrainian president for “litigating in front of the American media”, and saying his approach was “disrespectful”. At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said thank you even once?”
Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office”.
Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign, and in particular over what the US would offer Ukraine in terms of security guarantees in the event of a peace deal with Russia.
With the meeting between the two presidents and their teams cut short and Zelensky leaving Washington early, the deal seems off the table for now. Trump all but closed the door on Zelensky when he posted on his Truth Social platform that Zelensky could come back “when he is ready for peace.”
How much of a loss is this for Ukraine?
The deal looked more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. On offer was the creation of a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.
Into the proposed fund were to go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure).”
This means that private infrastructure — much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs — was likely to become part of the deal. This had the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.
Meanwhile, US contributions were less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.
This figure, according to Trump, amounts to $350 billion. The actual amount, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, is about half that.
Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed, and they may be less accessible. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.
Since the current draft left details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, future rounds of negotiations were inevitable.
From a Ukrainian perspective, this should have been seen as more of a strength than a weakness. It left Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if improvements would only be marginal, it would keep the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.
Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that “participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”
The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.
But it was an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do — a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.
Trump did not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seemed to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops. While the Kremlin had already cast doubts on this idea, European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, had carefully prepared the ground for this with Trump.
…because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction—if he and Zelensky find a way forward…
This meant that the idea was not completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction—if he and Zelensky find a way forward, which is by no means certain.
Trump can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favourable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defence spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in Nato.
However, the row in the White House is also likely to have done yet more damage to the transatlantic relationship. Most European leaders have rallied behind Zelensky again, and there is now a very real chance that Trump will abandon both Europe and Ukraine when he cuts a deal with Putin.
The deal also gave Trump the opportunity to signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a ceasefire deal stick—and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and a US corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities. This argument, too, has lost much of its credibility after the shouting match between Trump and Zelensky.
That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages was not even a given before the fall-out between Trump and Zelensky in the White House.
For now, the answer to the question of whether Zelensky has gambled away more than just a deal on his country’s minerals looks very uncomfortable for Ukraine and its European allies. How uncomfortable will ultimately depend even more on whether Europe can step up and take care of its own security without the US.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 28, 2025.
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