Two statements from world leaders this week bear closer examination. On May 27, US president Donald Trump took to his TruthSocial social media channel to proclaim that if it wasn’t for him, “lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia”. The following day the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, announced that his country would assist Ukraine in developing long-range missiles to deploy against targets inside Russia. Both statements are quite extraordinary.
Even by Trump’s own standards, the public declaration by a sitting US president that he is protecting the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is unprecedented. Putin is an indicted war criminal who has been waging a war of aggression against Ukraine for more than three years after having illegally annexed Crimea over a decade ago.
There can now be no doubt left that the US has become an unreliable ally for Ukraine and its European partners.
This is the context in which Merz’s announcement of increasing defence cooperation with Ukraine becomes significant. While Trump continues to chase an impossible deal with Putin – even after threatening to abandon his mediation efforts less than ten days ago – Germany has doubled down on Ukraine’s defence.
Not only that, but as the EU’s largest and Nato’s second-largest economy, Germany is now also aiming to turn its Bundeswehr into the “strongest conventional army in Europe”. Its most senior military officer, Carsten Breuer, has published plans for a rapid and wide-ranging expansion of defence capabilities.
Germany is finally beginning to pull its weight in European defence and security policy.
This is absolutely critical to the credibility of the EU in the face of the threat from Russia. Berlin has the financial muscle and the technological and industrial potential to make Europe more of a peer to the US when it comes to defence spending and burden sharing. This will be important to salvage what remains of Nato in light of a highly probable American down-scaling — if not complete abandonment — of its past security commitments to the alliance.
After decades of failing to develop either a grand strategy to deal with Russia or the hard power capabilities that need to underpin it, achieving either will take some time. But it is important to acknowledge that some critical first steps have been taken by the new German government.
For Germany, and much of the rest of Europe, the investment in more defence capabilities does not simply require producing more ammunition or procuring more advanced defence systems. These are important — but what is also needed is a significant investment in developing manpower. This means either finding more volunteers or reintroducing conscription, which is now no longer a taboo in Germany.
Deploying a whole new brigade to Lithuania is an important signal to Nato allies about Germany’s commitment to the alliance. It is also a clear signal to Russia that Germany finally is putting its money where its mouth is when it comes to containing the threat from Russia, which has grown significantly since the beginning of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The three years of Russia’s war against its neighbour have also highlighted the threat that Russia poses beyond Ukraine’s borders.
The war against Ukraine has exposed European vulnerabilities and its dependence on the United States. And it has taught military planners important lessons about what a likely future confrontation with Russia would look like. This is why Germany’s military planners have identified air defence systems, precision strike capabilities, drones, and electronic and cyber warfare assets as procurement priorities.
Beyond Germany, the signs have been that Europe more broadly is beginning to learn to stand on its own feet when it comes to its security. For the continent, the challenge is threefold. It needs to beef up its defence spending in light of the ongoing war against Ukraine and Russian threats to expand it further. Europe also needs to come to terms with the dismantling of the transatlantic alliance by Trump. And, finally, there is a growing populist surge that threatens the very foundations of European democracy and has the potential to undermine European security and defence efforts. This has been given extra fuel by the alignment of Trump’s America-first Maga movement with Putin’s Russia.
These are enduring challenges with no quick fixes.
The first test of this apparent new-found European mettle will be the war in Ukraine. Giving Ukraine permission to use long-range missiles against targets in Russia is not a new development. Such a move was first taken by the then US president, Joe Biden, in November 2024 when he authorised Ukraine to launch limited strikes into Russia using US-made long-range missiles, followed by similar authorisations from London and Paris at the time, but not Berlin.
Now, as then, how effective this will be depends not only on how many actual missiles Ukraine has but also on whether US intelligence sharing will continue which is crucial for targeting. What’s more, effectiveness will also be difficult to measure. In a best-case scenario, Ukraine will now be able to stave off Russia’s reportedly impending summer offensive.
The Kremlin has already indicated its displeasure and ratcheted up its nuclear sabre rattling. Trump, meanwhile, remains all talk when it comes to putting any pressure on Russia. By contrast, the Europeans, for once, are much more action orientated, which is another indication of the increasing rift across the Atlantic.
This does not mean an end to transatlantic relations and pragmatic cooperation, as demonstrated by the meeting between the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, with his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, which happened almost simultaneously with Trump’s and Merz’s statements.
What it does mean, however, is that Europe’s security now entirely depends on whether key players on the continent can muster the will to mobilise the resources required to defend the continent against an aggressive foe to the east. Berlin and other European capitals seem to have recognised at long last that this needs to happen. Now they need to demonstrate that they can follow through with swift and decisive action.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on May 29, 2025.
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