Renewed talk of no-longer secret negotiations between the Kremlin and the White House over a plan to end the war in Ukraine that heavily favours Russia has added to a broader sense of doom in Kyiv and among its western partners.
Coupled with the continuing fallout from a sweeping corruption scandal among Ukraine’s elites and stalling efforts in Brussels to provide additional financial aid to Kyiv, a storm is brewing that may lead to Moscow prevailing in its war of aggression.
However, this is not a foregone conclusion. True, Ukraine is having a very difficult time at the moment on various fronts. The fall of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine is a question of when, not if, and of how many men both sides will lose before Russia captures the ruins of the city.
Russia has also upped pressure on the Zaporizhian part of the front and around Kherson on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. It is very likely that the Kremlin will continue to push its current advantages, with fighting possibly increasing in the north again around Ukraine’s second-largest city of Kharkiv.
For now, the war of attrition clearly favours Russia. But from a purely military perspective, neither the fall of Pokrovsk nor further Russian territorial gains elsewhere spell the danger of an imminent Ukrainian collapse.
However, war is never solely a military endeavour — it also requires political will and financial resources.
A more existential threat to Ukraine’s war effort, therefore, is the continuing fallout from the corruption scandal. Here, too, certainties are few and far between.
A characteristic feature of political scandals in Ukraine is the difficulty of predicting the reaction of Ukrainian society to them. Some incidents can become a trigger for large-scale protests that lead to massive change.
This was the case with the Euromaidan revolution in 2014. The revolution triggered a chain of events from the annexation of Crimea to the Russian-proxy occupation of parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, to the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
By contrast, other political crises pass without major upheaval. This was the case with the dismissal of the popular commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, in 2024. Widely seen as a possible challenger to Volodymyr Zelensky in future presidential elections, Zaluzhnyi was subsequently sent into exile as Ukraine’s ambassador to London.
So far, the current corruption scandal has not sparked mass protests in Ukraine. Nor has there been a very harsh response from European leaders. But the fact that virtually all of Zelensky’s inner circle is involved in corruption, according to Ukraine’s national anti-corruption bureau (Nabu), has forced the president to launch a comprehensive response.
Sanctions were imposed on Timur Mindich, Zelensky’s long-term friend and business partner, who fled the country just hours before Nabu raids on November 10. Then, a week after the latest scandal broke, Ukraine’s parliament dismissed the ministers of justice and energy, German Galushchenko and Svitlana Hrynchukwho, who were both involved in the scandal.
Meanwhile, Zelensky himself has embarked on a whistle-stop diplomatic tour of European capitals to shore up support for his beleaguered government and country.
He managed to secure deliveries of US liquefied natural gas imports from Greece, which should help Ukraine through the difficult winter months. A landmark military deal with France also promises improved air defences for Ukraine in the short-term and the delivery of 100 fighter jets over the next decade.
Important as they are, these are, at best, stop-gap measures rather than game changers. And not even all the necessary stop-gap measures are done deals. The EU and its member states are still prevaricating on an urgently needed loan to Ukraine. If this loan does not materialise, Kyiv will run out of money in February to pay its soldiers, civil servants and pensioners.
In the meantime, Zelensky is also facing pressure from his own parliamentary faction, Servant of the People. He has presented his tour of Europe as a vote of confidence by his western allies. And, for now, he has avoided to offer the resignation of his long-time ally Andrii Yermak, who was also implicated in the latest corruption scandal.
As head of the presidential office, Yermak is sometimes considered the de-facto ruler of Ukraine. Dismissing him — which is still a possibility, albeit a remote one — would probably please Zelensky’s domestic and foreign critics. But it would also be a further sign that Zelensky’s political power is, perhaps, fatally weakened.
Critically missing in all of this are three things. The first is a Ukrainian succession plan. Opposition politicians like former president Petro Poroshenko and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko are both unpopular as they are tainted by allegations of corruption during their reigns.
There is also no clear route to replacing Zelensky if he refuses to step down. And even if he was replaced, a broader-based coalition government is unlikely to find a magic wand to turn Ukraine’s precarious military situation around.
The second unknown is the White House and its dealings with the Kremlin. The 28-point US-Russia peace plan yet again requires major concessions from Ukraine on territory and the future size of its army, while providing no effective security guarantees.
European foreign ministers have been quick to insist that any peace plan needs Ukrainian and European backing. A subsequent statement by a mixture of leaders of the G7 and the coalition of the willing, was more equivocal, noting that “the draft is a basis which will require additional work” and that they were “ready to engage in order to ensure that a future peace is sustainable.” But their appetite to push back hard may be waning. If Kyiv’s western allies get the sense that Ukraine and Zelensky are lost causes militarily and politically, they may cut their losses and retrench.
This would probably see Europe beef up its own defences and sign up to a US-backed plan that trades Ukrainian land and sovereignty, even it was just for the extremely slim prospects of Russia accepting and honouring such a bargain. A Ukraine territorially truncated along the lines of the latest US proposal and without meaningful and credible security guarantees would remain a European security liability — but perhaps a lesser one than a Ukraine still at war with Russia and deprived of US support.
The third critical unknown is whether Putin will cut a deal or drag out negotiations with Trump while pushing on regardless in Ukraine.
Putin’s past track record of playing for time speaks for itself. Recent comments by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov that there were no new developments to announce on a possible peace plan also strongly suggest that there has been no change in the Kremlin’s approach. Given what is apparently on the table, even if Putin were inclined to make a deal, it would hardly be of comfort for Kyiv and Brussels.
Any progress towards a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine is to be welcomed. It is unlikely that the latest US proposal is a major step in this direction. Simply dismissing it, however, will only heighten the danger for Ukraine and its European partners that talk of Ukraine’s political and military collapse turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The consequence of that — Kyiv’s submission to an all-out Russian peace dictate worse even than the latest US proposal — would be the result of the dysfunctional nature of Ukraine’s domestic politics and the fecklessness of western support as much as any collusion between Trump and Putin.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on November 20, 2025.
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