Biden's — and Zelenskyy's — last throw of the dice?
If the outgoing US president's gamble pays off, he will have done Ukraine a final favour.
In a surprise decision on November 17, 2024, the United States reversed course on a long-standing policy decision: Ukraine now has permission to use US-supplied long-range missiles for strikes deep inside Russian territory. Among European allies, French president Emmanuel Macron has welcomed the decision but stopped short of following suit.
Just 48 hours after Biden’s decision, Ukraine launched a strike against military installations in the Bryansk region of Russia. Accounts — unverified so far — of its impact were unsurprisingly different from Moscow and Kyiv. According to Russian reports, six ATTACMs were deployed by Ukraine and destroyed by Russian air defences, alongside a large number of drones that were part of the attack. Ukrainian and western reports, by contrast, note around a dozen secondary explosions at the target site.
But after 1,000 days of war, and just two months before Donald Trump will re-enter the White House, is Biden’s decision — like similar previous western decisions on what weapons to supply to Ukraine and what rules of engagement to attach to their use — too little too late?
Allowing Ukraine to attack targets well behind the frontlines will contribute to the predictable intensification of fighting following Trump’s re-election. Moscow and Kyiv are both trying to improve their positions on the battlefield ahead of an expected push for a ceasefire once Trump is in office — and possibly before then — that would freeze the conflict along the frontlines at the time of its imposition.
Until now, Russia was more successful in doing so. It has made gains both inside Ukraine and, with the help of over 10,000 North Korean soldiers, in the Kursk region. Ukraine has been at a clear disadvantage, outnumbered and unable to disrupt Russian supply lines, destroy airbases, and target staging areas of troops behind Russian frontlines. There were also clear indications of a very real risk that Ukrainian defence lines are crumbling — both in the Donbas area in the east and around Kharkiv in the northeast.
The momentum of Russian success in pushing back the incursion into Kursk also increases the danger of opening another front on Ukrainian territory. Russian troops and equipment deployed in Kursk could simply be used to push further into Ukraine once Ukrainian forces were driven out of Russian territory.
Not only would this deprive Kyiv of its only bargaining chip in future negotiations with Moscow, it would also give the Kremlin additional leverage — both over Ukraine and vis-à-vis its allies in the US and Europe.
Biden’s decision to relax restrictions on the use of the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, was reportedly a response to Russia’s deployment of North Korean troops, according to US officials, but was likely also influenced by one of Moscow’s largest airstrikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure the night before.
His decision will not, however, be a game changer. The range of the missiles available to Ukraine is around 300km inside Russia — this is common enough knowledge that Russia will have moved some of its critical capabilities beyond their reach and done so probably well before Biden’s decision. The fact that Ukraine’s first strike since Biden’s permission targeted facilities in the Bryansk region — in the trilateral border area of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus — might be an indication that there are limited other worthwhile targets closer to the front lines.
The use of just six ballistic missiles, albeit in combination with a large number of drones, might be an indication that Ukraine, for now at east, has relatively limited stock of these missiles and cannot commit them in large numbers to individual strikes. This, of course might change in the coming weeks, including if other counties, like the UK, France, and Germany, give permission for their weapons to be used in a similar way.
In all likelihood, the relief for Ukraine, therefore, will only be temporary. The best that can be hoped for is that Ukraine will be able to stabilise the current frontlines and avoid further losses of territory until at least January 20, 2025, the day of Trump’s inauguration.
With so much at stake, significant risks also come with the decision. One is, of course, Russia’s reaction — unpredictable both in terms of its nature and its timing.
A Russian lawmaker, Maria Butina, has already raised the spectre of World War III, echoing a similar threat from President Vladimir Putin in September. Predictably, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rattled Moscow’s nuclear sabre yet again, announcing an imminent approval of changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which have now been signed off by Putin.
While it is unlikely that Putin would go directly after NATO countries now, Russia most likely has the capability to exact a high price on Ukraine, potentially even pre-emptively before Kyiv can land any blows. Regardless of the timing, Putin is more likely to double down on pressure against Ukraine on all fronts, including in the campaign against civilian infrastructure. As a result, any Ukrainian gains, at least to some extent, are likely to be offset by Russia’s response and Ukraine might ultimately not be able to capitalise on relaxed US rules of engagement to the extent it had hoped.
Another risk is the reaction from the next Trump administration. One of the incoming president’s foreign policy advisers, Richard Grenell, has already criticised the decision. Trump himself, however, may look at it as a way of Biden putting pressure on Putin now that will give him more leverage once he takes office to “settle” the war. It could make it easier to pressure Putin to accept a deal if Russia lost the momentum it currently has on the battlefield.
What is clear is that, after 1,000 days of gruelling war, allowing Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with US weapons now is too little and too late for a military victory.
It may, however, be just enough to avoid a humiliating defeat at a negotiation table chaired by Trump.
This is an expanded and updated version of a commentary published by Channel News Asia on November 19, 2024.
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