As the war in the Middle East spreads and intensifies, the one in Ukraine continues. While geographically some 2,500 km (1,600 miles) apart, the impact of US president Donald Trump’s latest military adventure on the Russian war against Ukraine will be acutely felt across several areas. In the short term, the Kremlin will probably feel emboldened to double down on its aggression, but this is unlikely to shift the dial significantly towards Russian victory in the long term.
The targeted killing of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a precision US strike will likely have reminded the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of his reportedly “apoplectic” reaction to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Comments on social media from the likes of far-right nationalist Alexander Dugin, who posted, that “one by one, our allies are being systematically destroyed”, and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who alleged that the “talks with Iran were just a cover”, are unlikely to have steadied Putin’s nerves.
The Russian leader’s fears about being next after a string of US successes targeting foreign leaders may have been played up somewhat by the western media, but they are not completely unfounded. Putin continues to walk a fine line between paranoia and his outrage over the killing of Khamenei, which he condemned in a condolence letter to the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law”. But he did not mention Trump or the US as the culprits.
Concerns about his own longevity, however, will not be the only things weighing on Putin’s mind and compelling him to double down on his war against Ukraine. The escalation of violence in the Middle East also offers Russia several opportunities in its war of aggression against Ukraine — at least in the short term.
The sharp rise in oil prices throws Moscow a new lifeline for financing its ongoing war. Not only did prices spike — with Brent crude oil hitting $85 per barrel for the first time in almost two years — but the sudden, and likely lasting, inability of Iran to export oil will also have a major impact on China, which bought over 80% of all Iranian maritime oil exports, equivalent to some 13% of Chinese maritime oil imports.
China has large stockpiles of oil which will allow it to ride out current inflation. But Beijing is now likely to double down on its energy relationship with Russia. This will serve both countries well: Russia will deepen its economic ties with China and rebalance the relationship, while China will tap into a reliable supply line that will not be as vulnerable to being choked off as maritime supply routes in a future confrontation with the US.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes against oil and gas facilities across the Gulf countries have destabilised global energy markets. With some 30% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of all trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade affected, this represents a market opportunity for Russia and its shadow fleet of tankers, at least in the short term, given that Moscow retains sufficient refining and port capacity — despite a long Ukrainian air campaign against the country’s oil infrastructure.
Another likely benefit the Kremlin will reap are problems with weapons supplies to Ukraine. While insisting that the US had “virtually unlimited supply” of weapons and munitions, Trump also conceded that there were areas “at the highest end, (where) we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be”. This is a view echoed within the Pentagon where officials are keen to discuss an acceleration of weapons production with key arms manufacturers.
With large parts of western military support for Ukraine consisting of US weapons paid for by Kyiv’s European allies via NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, shortages on the US side will immediately impact the flow of vital equipment to Ukraine. Even deliveries already agreed could be derailed. In June 2025, during the so-called 12-day war with Iran, the US diverted some 20,000 missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East.
Russia is unlikely to face any similar constraints. On the contrary: a Russian-Iranian deal in late 2022 enabled Moscow to acquire technology from Tehran that allowed the Kremlin to kick-start domestic drone production based on the Iranian Shahed design. Not only has Russia improved the drones, it now also produces them faster and cheaper than Iran ever did.
If western military supplies to Ukraine now dry up even temporarily as a result of an increased focus of the US on the Middle East, Russia’s air superiority and the devastating impact its relentless campaign of missile and drone strikes has had on Ukraine is likely to continue unabated for now.
At the same time, however, this drives home the point that dependence on the US puts Ukraine and its European allies in an unacceptably precarious position. Ukraine’s own defence industry already meets half of the country’s needs, and the fallout from Iran war will likely further accelerate homegrown military production and innovation across Europe as the traditional US-European alliance frays.
In the short term, however, this ongoing transatlantic decoupling will serve Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. European countries, including the UK, France, and Spain, have been critical of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, earning them the expected rebukes from Trump.
The White House might be too busy to follow through on threats “to cut off all trade” with Spain, but it will equally not put much effort into already fraught mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Given the dismal performance of Trump’s own efforts and those of his negotiation team, as well as the pressure that the US had put on Ukraine rather than Russia to cut a deal, this may not be much of a loss.
But US diplomatic disengagement from the Russian war against Ukraine still poses a problem as Washington is the only player with the leverage to bring both sides together and — if Trump were to decide so — achieve a just and sustainable peace agreement between them.
Ukraine and its European partners may be able to prevent a Russian victory, but it will take some time for them to develop the military and political muscle to force Russia to make meaningful concessions that could pave the way towards a durable and acceptable settlement.
If nothing else, Trump’s war of choice in the Middle East is another factor in prolonging the war against Ukraine. Regardless of its short-term effects, it will not make a Russian victory more likely. But it has thrown the world into additional turmoil for no good reason whatsoever, and it will delay the much-needed restoration of peace in Europe.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on March 5, 2026.
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