Over the last few days, Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from the town of Siversk in the Donetsk region. This brings Russian troops to within 30km of Sloviansk which is the most important hub in the northern part of the so-called fortress belt of cities in Ukraine’s east.
This latest withdrawal caps a year of important territorial losses for Kyiv.
With assistance from North Korean troops, Russia has pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region. Moscow also seized some territory in the northern Ukrainian region of Sumy, where fighting flared up again recently. In the east, and after a long and costly campaign, it captured Pokrovsk, another key fortress that Ukraine held onto until December.
All of these losses were painful for Ukraine, but they have not led to an actual collapse of the frontlines. Russia either did not have the forces to capitalise on its advances or has been, as is currently the case around Pokrovsk, prevented from doing so by Ukrainian resistance.
Individually Ukrainian losses were not strategic victories for Russia, and even collectively they do not mark a decisive turn in fortunes for either side. Moreover, the actual territory gained is relatively small, and overall, the frontline, which still stretches to over 1,000 kilometres in length has not shifted much. But wherever it has shifted, it has — with only few exceptions such as in Kupyansk recently — done so mostly to Russia’s advantage. All of this has come at huge cost in men and materiel, more so to Russia, but also to Ukraine.
On the diplomatic front, the year has been more mixed.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has certainly improved the outlook for Russia, but again not in a game-changing way. After multiple proposals, deadlines, acrimonious and disastrous presidential meetings, and a lot of shuttle diplomacy, a clear pathway towards a ceasefire, let alone a lasting peace agreement, is yet to emerge.
Another round of talks in Florida between US and Ukrainian and European negotiators, seems to have resulted in a broad agreement on security guarantees, post-war rehabilitation, and a general framework for ending the war. This new 20-point plan a much-improved version of an earlier 28-point plan floated by the White House and based on significant Russian input. It also comes after Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, accepted that Ukraine could give up on its NATO membership ambitions as part of a peace deal.
The main sticking point in the current set of proposals remains the question of territory.
Here, too, there appears to be some movement towards a possible compromise in the form of a demilitarized zone in those areas of the Donbas that Russia claims but does not yet control. A smaller free economic zone around the Russia-controlled Zaporizhzhya nuclear power station has also been suggested as a way forward on this particular issue. Zelensky now appears keen to resolve the remaining issues directly with Trump.
Getting Trump to back a Ukrainian-accepted set of proposals would strengthen the Ukrainian position overall. But as the past 11 months of Trump 2.0 have clearly indicated, this is not merely about the substance of a deal but also, and often more importantly, about the process.
Washington at times appears more interested in resetting relations with Russia than in peace for Ukraine.
In his dealings with both Zelensky and Putin, the US president has left little doubt that any peace deal will also be a business deal and be negotiated, for the most part, not by seasoned diplomats but by friends and family aligned to Trump’s personal interests and his America-first agenda. This highly disruptive approach to peace making has inserted a new dynamism into the peace process but produced few tangible or desirable results.
Trump’s diplomacy on Ukraine, as well as more generally, has alienated core transatlantic allies and has time and again enabled consequence-free Russian push-back. There are no signs that this pattern will end in the near future.
Nor will Russia stop playing for time. After the current proposals were shared with Russia, the Kremlin responded saying that while they will be studied carefully and a position be prepared on this basis, while the Russian foreign ministry noted “slow but steady progress”.
Given that Zelensky, domestically weakened by yet another corruption scandal, has already made a number of important concessions, such as on NATO membership and on a demilitarized zone, the question is how much more Ukraine can possibly give or be expected to give.
Kyiv’s recent concessions should partly be seen as an effort to keep the US, and President Trump personally, engaged in the process.
It also reflects Kyiv’s precarious overall position. Ukraine has achieved some reprieve after the EU managed to agree on a €90 billion loan last week and Kyiv negotiated a deal to restructure around €2 billion in growth-linked debt. But in the absence of stronger US sanctions and a restoration of US military support to pre-Trump levels, the overall balance of power in the war still seems to favour Russia. This, too, is unlikely to change anytime soon.
At the same time, Russia continues its devastating air campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. This has severely degraded the country’s power grid and disproportionately affects the civilian population. Despite this, there is still a strong majority of Ukrainians that oppose territorial concessions to Russia as part of a settlement. The number of Ukrainians willing to fight on as long as necessary currently stands at 63% — the highest since October 2024.
Moscow’s de-facto rejection of a Christmas ceasefire is an indication that the Kremlin is unwilling to lose the momentum Russia currently perceives to have in its air and ground campaigns.
It is a signal to Washington and Brussels that Putin is determined to keep fighting until he has achieved his war aims or until Ukraine makes concessions at the negotiation table to this effect. It is meant to buttress the Russian narrative of an inevitable victory, regardless the time and resources it will take to achieve. Moreover, on the remote chance that Trump again decides to put more pressure on Putin to accept the current frontline as the basis of a territorial settlement, any additional square kilometre gained creates a more favourable position for Russia.
Eventually, the war in Ukraine will end.
What this end will look like is as unclear as when and how the sides will navigate there. After almost four bloody years, the fighting in Ukraine is likely to continue unabated for the time being as neither of the warring sides, nor their backers, appear exhausted enough for peace. Nor does the White House as the main mediator in the conflict seem to have a credible plan for a sustainable settlement and how to get there.
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