Lebanon strikes expose a major flaw in Trump’s Iran deal
Israel’s fight with Hezbollah and other Iranian regional proxies is part of a strategy that predates, and is at odds with, US President Donald Trump’s war.
Within less than 24 hours, United States President Donald Trump went from threatening that Iran’s “whole civilisation will die tonight” to announcing a two-week ceasefire, subject to “the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.” Another six hours later, he mused that “this could be the Golden Age of the Middle East!!!”
That golden vision quickly disappeared behind the smoke of a massive Israeli bombardment of Lebanon, exposing a major flaw in Mr Trump’s deal with Iran — no explicit inclusion of Israel — and laid bare just how his administration lacks a coherent strategy for the Middle East as a whole.
Iran called Israeli attacks in Lebanon a “grave violation” of the deal and warned of “strong responses”.
The US and Israel have insisted the ceasefire did not include Lebanon. Mr Trump called it a “separate skirmish”, keeping Lebanon distinct from Iran while urging Israel to scale back its attacks to help with US-Iran peace talks over the weekend, which subsequently collapsed over Iran’s nuclear programme and prompted the US president to impose his own blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. In parallel to this escalation, Trump continues to float ideas about a grand bargain with Iran and a resumption of talks with Tehran.
If Trump’s intention is to buy himself time to secure a halfway intact deal and walk away from an unpopular war, then Israel’s continuing war in Lebanon is a major liability for him. This is hardly surprising for three reasons.
First, Israel’s objectives do not align well with Mr Trump’s war goals that have been shifting since the first US strikes on Feb 28.
The US president now seems more concerned with the economic backlash – domestic pump prices, consumer inflation and the volatile stock market. This could explain why he readily agreed to a truce that leaves him in a much weaker negotiation position. If the Strait of Hormuz reopens, it will make it more difficult for him to restart the war.
Israel, by contrast, views the war as an existential conflict. The minimum victory from an Israeli perspective is a substantially weakened regime in Tehran, deprived of its current military capabilities, of its regional proxies and most importantly, of any meaningful capacity to rebuild them.
For Tel Aviv, a ceasefire is but a pause to rearm and regroup. The easiest way out of the current pause in the war would be to get Iran to restart the war and bring Mr Trump back into military action.
Second, Israel’s continuing attacks on Hezbollah serve a different function.
To Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this is part of a survival strategy that is predicated on the creation of ever-larger buffer zones around Israel – in Lebanon, where attacks are currently focused, but also in Gaza, the West Bank and Syria.
Israel has vowed to occupy the parts of south Lebanon it currently controls and has been carrying out ground incursions into southwestern Syria. An Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire has officially been in place since the end of November 2024, though this was never fully implemented or respected by either side.
This strategy predates the current war with Iran, with public calls for the annexation of southern Lebanon by one of Mr Netanyahu’s coalition partners going back to March 2023.
And it is likely to outlive the US war with Iran, especially if a deal that Mr Trump negotiates leaves the Iranian regime with enough capacity to continue supporting its regional proxy forces.
Third, the reaction of other countries in the region, especially the Gulf states, is something of a wild card.
Initially opposed to the war against Iran, Tehran’s direct attacks on their critical energy and water infrastructure have likely hardened their opposition to the Iranian regime.
With Mr Trump now potentially walking away from an essentially unfinished project of regime degradation — let alone regime change — it could leave them more vulnerable and exposed. This is likely to be one reason for now confirmed talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The Gulf states will have little sympathy for either Israel or Hezbollah, but they are heavily dependent on a return to calm and stability in the region. They will likely see Mr Trump as a less dependable ally but will also be less dependable allies for him.
How these tensions play out in the coming weeks and months will be critical for another one of Mr Trump’s “peace projects” — Gaza.
A ceasefire has been in place in the strip since Oct 10, 2025, after a two-year war. And the Gulf states, in particular, are meant to play a major role in the region’s recovery.
But the Iran war has diverted resources and attention away from the implementation of the second phase of the Gaza deal, which is more complex than pausing hostilities and exchanging hostages and prisoners.
Mr Netanyahu might soon find himself in a situation where he is not just fighting a war in Lebanon but where full-on confrontation with Hamas resumes in Gaza. Israel is capable of fighting such a two-front war, but more easily so if he can further weaken Hezbollah now.
For that reason alone, any pause to Israeli strikes in Lebanon is unlikely to lead to a sustainable peace. And if the US does withdraw from the Iran war in these conditions, peace will also be less attainable for the region it leaves behind.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on April 11, 2026.
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