Within twenty-four hours last week, US president Donald Trump performed yet another pivot in his approach to the Russian war against Ukraine. It is almost customary for him now to first express anger and frustration with his Russian counter-part, Vladimir Putin, then to threaten severe consequences, and finally to find some imaginary silver lining that, in his considered view alone, justifies backing down and essentially dancing to the Russian dictator’s tune again.
The latest iteration of this by now very predictable sequence of events unfolded as follows. Back in September, while he was still busy pushing his ultimately unsuccessful campaign to be awarded the Nobel peace prize, the US president began to envisage a Ukrainian victory against Russia that would see Kyiv reclaim all territories lost to Russia’s aggression beginning with the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.
To make this happen, there was suddenly talk of US deliveries of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, which would have enabled strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure far beyond the current reach of most of Ukraine’s weapons. Despite some doubt about the logistical feasibility of such deliveries, especially in sufficiently large quantities, there was a widespread expectation that the necessary details were being worked out during two phone calls between Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, on October 11 and 12. A deal was meant to be announced after their meeting in the White House, scheduled for October 17.
Yet, the day before that meeting, Trump, apparently at the Kremlin’s request, took a phone call from Putin. Over the course of two hours of flattery and promises of reinvigorated trade relations, the Russian president managed to get Trump to back off his threat to supply Ukraine with Tomahawks.
This message was promptly delivered the following day to the Ukrainian delegation led by Zelensky. While clearly not as disastrous as their first encounter in the White House in February this year, Ukraine’s humiliation was clear. Not only were Tomahawks taken off the table, but Kyiv and its European allies are essentially back to square one and the very real possibility of a deal between Putin and Trump.
Or rather two deals to be hammered out by senior officials first and then sealed at another Trump-Putin summit in Budapest. The first deal would likely be on the broader terms of a peace settlement. After the meeting with Zelensky, Trump posted on his social media channel that Russia and Ukraine should simply accept the current status quo and stop the fighting. Trump thus appears determined — again — to stop the fighting in Ukraine on the basis of a compromise between Russia and Ukraine. A compromise, however, which means that Ukraine would lose as much as 20% of its internationally recognised territory — something that Kyiv and its European allies have repeatedly rejected as unacceptable.
The second deal would be on resetting relations between Washington and Moscow. This is something that Trump has been keen on for some time and suggests that more severe sanctions on Russia and its enablers, including India and China, are unlikely forthcoming any time soon.
Before Zelensky’s trip to Washington, there appeared to be some genuine hope that a ceasefire could be established as early as November. But Trump’s arrangements with Putin do not mention a ceasefire at all and make an end to the fighting conditional on a deal between the American and Russian presidents, which Zelensky is then simply expected to accept. This will put further pressure on Ukraine which continues to suffer from daily attacks against critical infrastructure that are particularly harmful to the country’s economy and civilian population and foreshadow another difficult winter.
So far so bad for Ukraine. But this was not an accidental outcome that could have gone the other way, depending on the whims of Trump. Ever since the US president appeared to shift gear in his approach to the war in late September, the Kremlin carefully prepared the ground for a rapprochement between the two presidents — with a mixture of concern, threats, and a good dose of flattery.
The goal of this rapprochement, however, is not a better peace deal for Russia, which Putin surely knows is unrealistic. Rather, it appears, the Kremlin’s main goal was buying itself more time for the continuation of its costly but at least somewhat successful ground offensive along the frontlines in Ukraine’s Donbas region where Moscow does not control all of the territory it has formally annexed.
And buying time is best achieved by preventing the US from fully backing the position of Ukraine and its European allies. In this context, the choice of venue for a potentially deal-clinching summit between Trump and Putin is also interesting. Given Hungary’s location, it will not be possible for Putin to get to Budapest without travelling through NATO airspace and through the airspace of countries that are at least candidate states for EU membership. This will put serious pressure on the EU and NATO to allow Putin passage or otherwise be seen as obstructing Trump’s peace-making efforts — a narrative that the Kremlin has been peddling for some time and that is part of its strategy to disrupt the Transatlantic relationship.
Putin may well feel that he has scored important points by delaying, yet again, more decisive US support for Ukraine. Yet, it does not bring him closer to victory — because Trump’s latest turnaround, difficult as it may be for Kyiv to stomach, does not bring Ukraine closer to defeat. In Ukraine, mobilization is in full swing and domestic arms production is increasing. Ukraine is further helped by the commitment of more than half of Nato’s member states to invest in the so-called Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List of critical weapons and ammunitions that Nato allies have agreed to purchase on Ukraine’s behalf from the US.
There are three key take-aways from the diplomatic flurry over the past few weeks.
First, for all of Putin’s bluster, the threat of supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles clearly had an effect. Putin made a move to reach out to Trump, thereby exposing an obvious vulnerability on Russia’s part.
Second, and this barely needed confirmation, Trump is not a dependable ally of Ukraine or within the Transatlantic alliance. He clearly has not given up on the possibility of a US-Russia deal, including one concluded behind the back and at the expense of Ukraine and its European allies.
Finally, Zelensky may be down again after his latest fruitless encounter with Trump, but Ukraine is definitely not out. After all, Trump was right that Russia is a bit of a paper tiger and Ukraine can still win this war, or at least negotiate an acceptable settlement. Until Europe steps up, however, the key to achieving this remains in the White House.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on October 20, 2025.
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