Land for peace, take it or leave it. A deal proposed by the United States to end Russia’s war in Ukraine — negotiated in secret with Moscow — initially appeared to be an ultimatum to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy until his US counterpart Donald Trump said on Saturday (November 22) that it was not his “final offer”. Three days later, he reiterated that his original deadline was off.
Kyiv and its allies rejected the draft as too favourable to Moscow and discussions on an “updated and refined peace framework” with Ukraine are ongoing. But it is the timing of the leaked 28-point plan that makes it interesting.
Before details of this plan emerged, it seemed that Mr Trump was finally acting on his threat to sanction Russia for its invasion and force it to negotiate peace in good faith.
Russia has offered no meaningful concessions on the maximalist demands it has stuck to since at least late 2022. There were no tangible outcomes after the Alaska summit between Mr Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in August. A follow-up summit was cancelled.
Seemingly frustrated and targeting a crucial economic lifeline, Mr Trump ordered sanctions on two of Russia‘s oil majors — Rosneft and Lukoil — which took effect on November 21, albeit with a significant number waivers in place for one of the sanctioned companies, Lukoil. He threatened secondary sanctions on their foreign customers, especially in India, China, and Europe.
And more importantly, he apparently gave the green light for US lawmakers to pursue legislation, first introduced in April, that would give him further powers to impose such primary and secondary sanctions.
This is classic Russian timing. Just as the US president signals another hardening of his approach, the Russian side indicates a new-found flexibility regarding a deal on Ukraine. That was the case in April and May this year and again in July and August. Each time it appeared that Mr Trump was falling out with Mr Putin, and each time the Russian president managed to lure him back into the charade of Russian engagement — with a phone call in May and then with their summit in Alaska in August.
Such moves to appear actively committed to peace negotiations have saved Mr Putin several times from more serious US measures in support of Ukraine.
The timing was also advantageous for Russia because Mr Zelenskyy is under serious pressure from a new corruption scandal involving several people from his inner circle. Developments on the frontlines in the east and south of Ukraine, where Russia continues to make steady gains, also endanger Mr Zelenskyy‘s grip on power, making him potentially more likely to accept Russian demands.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the original 28-point plan, despite at least some US co-authorship, had significant Russian input. The origins of this particular plan appear to be in an October meeting between US special envoy Steve Wittkoff, Mr Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Mr Putin’s close ally Kirill Dmitriev, who is the head of one of Russia‘s sovereign wealth funds. The plan was drafted outside the US’ so-called inter-agency process – which would have ensured close coordination, among others, between the state department, the defence department, and the national security council.
Mr Dmitriev, by contrast, is unlikely to have acted outside the closely monitored power structures under Mr Putin‘s control. The Russian president‘s assertion that this was “essentially an updated plan“ of what had already been discussed in Alaska, that Russia simply “received … through the existing communication channels with the US administration” is hardly the full story.
The source of the original leak story in Axios was an unnamed official on the American side. The plan’s murky origins and the flawed process through which the initial 28-point version of the plan emerged explain its messy contents which would have been a bad deal for Ukraine.
Under the terms of what was first leaked, Ukraine would not just cede territory but lose more than what Russia currently — and illegally — occupies. The plan specifically required Ukrainian forces to withdraw from parts of Donetsk it controls, which is something that would be politically very hard for Mr Zelenskyy to accept. According to the original plan, Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk would be wholly considered Russian territory, while Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be frozen along the line of contact.
Kyiv was also supposed to surrender sovereignty over key foreign policy decisions, such as its choice to pursue NATO membership, in exchange for weak security guarantees and vague promises for reconstruction. In the typical deal-making approach to foreign policy favoured by Mr Trump, the United States was to be compensated for providing any security guarantees and to profit handsomely from reconstruction projects in Ukraine once the war ended.
Unsurprisingly, Mr Zelenskyy was not overly enthusiastic about the plan, framing it as a choice between national humiliation and losing American backing. His European and other allies were less equivocal, pointing out that the plan required additional work. On Sunday, November 23, they published their counter-proposals which seek to offer more assurances to Ukraine, which were, of course, promptly rejected by Russia as unconstructive.
Ukraine has little choice but to engage with the US-led peace process. So, the fact that there is still room for negotiation is one of the few positive developments over the past few days. Negotiations between the US, Ukraine, and key European allies were conducted in Geneva on Sunday and Monday. They resulted in a new framework deal, consisting of just 19 points, with key decisions, especially regarding territorial concessions to be left for a discussion between Mr Trump and Mr Zelenskyy, possibly later this week.
Since then, the discussions have moved to Abu Dhabi. While their exact format is unclear, US, Ukrainian, and Russian negotiators are on site. This signals a degree of seriousness among the participants that reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic breakdown of relationships across the Atlantic while offering a concrete opportunity for progress towards a deal that might be acceptable — at least on paper — to both Moscow and Kyiv. Whether a compromise is possible will likely become clearer next week when Mr Wittkoff is expected to return to Moscow for another round of discussions in the Kremlin.
What is particularly important for Ukraine and Europe is to maintain a working relationship with the US and keep Washington constructively engaged in the peace process, however shambolic it might appear at times. Neither can currently afford a US withdrawal from what is an existential security crisis for Europe, let alone a backroom deal that normalises relations between the US and Russia and leaves Ukraine and Europe to fend for themselves.
The progress achieved in Geneva over the weekend and the opportunities that this created in Abu Dhabi and for further US-Russia talks in Moscow was possible because the pushback against the original plan was not only confined to Ukraine and Europe. There has also been significant disquiet among Russia hawks in Mr Trump‘s Republican party.
But all this is indicative of how dysfunctional policy making on such a crucial foreign policy issue has become under Mr Trump. For now, it seems that the traditional institutions and processes on both sides of the Atlantic — and the communication channels between them — are still functioning well enough. This enables them to exert sufficient influence at crisis moments to avert the kind of catastrophe that the 28-point plan hashed out between Mr Witkoff, Mr Kushner and Mr Dmitriev embodied.
However, the amateurish nature of a process that produced this plan and was led on the US side by two real-estate dealers should continue to be the real worry for Ukraine and its partners.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on November 25, 2025.
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