Moldova's uncertain future
A contested referendum on EU membership and an inconclusive first round of presidential elections foreshadow further setbacks for the country.
On October 20, 2024, Moldovans voted in the first round of presidential elections and in a referendum on whether to enshrine the country’s commitment to EU membership in the constitution. Neither poll ended with defeat for the pro-western camp in the deeply divided country, but the results do not present a clear path forward either. On the contrary, further setbacks are all but certain.
In the presidential elections, the incumbent pro-western Maia Sandu, achieved 42.49% of the vote. She will be joined in the second round of voting on November 3 by the country’s former prosecutor general, Alexandr Stoianoglo, who received 25.95%.
Stoianoglo has the support of the Party of Socialists of Moldova (PSRM) and its leader, former president Igor Dodon. Stoianoglo was dismissed as prosecutor general after Sandu’s Party for Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured enough seats in in the 2021 legislative elections to do so. There are several anti-corruption cases still ongoing against him (although in one case the European Court of Human Rights sided with his claim that his right to a fair trial had been violated).
Sandu’s result in the first round is better than what she achieved in the first round of the 2020 presidential elections (both in her absolute and relative share of the vote), but it does not make her victory in the second round a foregone conclusion.
The results of the referendum were not clear-cut either. Despite earlier polls that had widely predicted 55%+ in favour of constitutional change, the yes-camp won by a razor-thin margin, securing 50.35% of votes, compared to 49.65% for the no-camp. This means that just under 100,000 more Moldovans cast a vote in favour for EU membership than for Sandu. However, the electoral arithmetic of Moldovan politics is more complex than just adding these additional pro-EU votes to Sandu’s potential performance in the second round of presidential elections.
Because of the resounding victory won by Sandu’s PAS in the 2021 parliamentary elections, the president is closely identified with the government. Badly affected by Covid and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, and slow in delivering on its key 2021 campaign promise of justice reform, the government is seen as underperforming. This has boosted Sandu’s rivals in both the presidential elections and the referendum.
A sense of social, economic, and political crisis is nothing new for most Moldovans, but the extent to which this sense of crisis has been exacerbated by a very well resourced and highly skilled Russian-led influence campaign is. Vote-buying and disinformation have reached an unprecedented high in Moldovan politics over the past several months.
It will probably never be known for certain how many no-votes in the referendum and votes for candidates other than Sandu in the first round of the elections were the result of bribes and lies, but this was not a fair contest. Nor can the second round of voting in the presidential elections be expected to be free from foreign interference.
Referenda have a tendency to polarise societies. In the case of Moldova, this is certainly true, albeit with the caveat that the country has been polarised for decades when it comes to its geopolitical orientation. The problem is that both sides frame the problem in binary terms. For Sandu and her supporters, a choice for the EU is one for democracy, prosperity, and peace; for her opponents it increases the risks of being dragged into the war in Ukraine and suffer its economic and social consequences.
A choice against the EU, for advocates of a European future for Moldova, represents a return to the poverty, marginalisation, and repression of the Soviet era; their detractors fondly remember the certainties, stability, and social equalities of live under Moscow’s rule.
Add to that the very real horrors of the war in neighbouring Ukraine, and the prospect of democracy, peace, and prosperity through EU membership looks far less certain and credible than threats from the Kremlin and its surrogates in Moldova.
Moreover, a perception that the west has limited its military aid for Ukraine in response to Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling, an increasingly palpable sense of Ukraine fatigue in western capitals, and uncertainty over the outcome of the US elections on 5 November have heightened the sense of unease among Moldovans.
As a result, almost half of them appear to have decided that the short-term cost of committing to the EU far outweighs the potential long-term benefits. This is also evident from the fact that support for Sandu and her EU agenda was significantly higher among diaspora voters. She secured 70.71% of the diaspora vote in round one of the presidential elections, compared to Stoianoglo’s 8.06%. The yes-vote in the EU referendum similarly dwarfed the no-vote with 76.79% compared to 23.21%. Without the diaspora vote, approximately 15% of the overall vote, the referendum would have been lost, and more decisively than it was won with it.
Even if Sandu wins and even if a political crisis can be averted, there is no clear pathway to constitutional change. Moldova’s constitution requires a two-thirds majority for any amendments, and the PAS parliamentary party currently only includes 62 of 101 members. If there had been a resounding yes-vote, some non-PAS members of parliament might have voted with the government for a constitutional amendment. Even with a second term for Sandu, it is now unlikely that PAS will improve on its 2021 election results and gain a constitutional majority in 2025.
Regardless of the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections, the deep divisions in Moldovan society will persist. Unless the winner of the second round makes a genuine effort to reach out to the other side, polarisation, and radicalisation, will in all probability increase.
The losing side will likely contest the results, and there is a strong prospect of yet another political crisis in Moldova, and potentially one that will carry on into the next parliamentary elections, due by the autumn of 2025. This is not necessarily going to take a violent turn, but an escalation in this direction cannot be excluded either, given, in particular, Russia’s track record of sabotage and false-flag operations.
This, ultimately, will also send a note of caution to the EU and member state capitals. The fact that Moldovans collectively are uncertain about their European future will also give rise to doubts about whether the EU is willing and able to absorb the risks of Moldovan membership.
An earlier version of this article was published on 31 October 2024 by the UK in a Changing Europe academic think tank.
We hope you'll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to the Navigating the Vortex podcast via the website or on all major podcast platforms, including: