Countdown to all-out war in the Middle East?
Further escalation on the border between Israel and Lebanon is almost inevitable after massive exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel, but a full-scale regional war is still avoidable.
The early hours of Sunday (Aug 25) saw one of the biggest clashes between Hezbollah and Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. Reactions in the coming hours and days will determine whether the long-feared full-scale escalation towards a regional war is now under way.
The Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militia group launched a barrage of more than 320 Katyusha rockets which it claims hit 11 military targets in Israel. Just prior to that, the Israeli military carried out strikes against alleged Hezbollah missile launch sites in southern Lebanon, which it said was to pre-empt a more deadly attack.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already vowed a tough response. The pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah on Sunday morning certainly indicates that, for now, Israel has both the intelligence and military capabilities to reign in its adversaries in the region.
The timing of the Hezbollah strikes – especially the thwarted larger missile attacks – is telling.
It comes after yet another visit by United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken – his ninth since the start of the Gaza war – to the region that ended without any breakthrough on a ceasefire deal. While negotiations on a ceasefire, mediated by the US, Egypt and Qatar, have resumed in Cairo, an agreement remains elusive.
There is also an ongoing visit by Air Force General CQ Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top military official in the US, which indicates both the priority that Washington attaches to the crisis, as well as the dimming prospects that a full-scale regional war can be averted.
US expectations that it would unavoidably be drawn into such a confrontation are also clear from the increased deployment of American forces in the region. This is not merely a question of honouring a commitment to defend a long-time ally in the region, but also a question of force protection for Washington which retains a number of military bases across the wider region which are all potentially vulnerable to attacks from Iran and its proxy forces.
All this points into the direction of further escalation, and Hezbollah’s attacks may well have been only the opening salvo in what is likely to turn at least into another round of tit-for-tat clashes along Israel’s northern border.
Hezbollah’s ominous statement that today’s strike had completed "the first phase" of its response to the assassination of Fuad Shukr and that the full response would take "some time" certainly indicates the inclination for a drawn-out campaign of retaliation.
Beyond intent, Hezbollah also has the capabilities to inflict more damage on Israel. In particular, the prospect of its deployment of the more sophisticated and longer-range missiles in its mostly Iranian-supplied arsenal makes further escalation with Israel likely. Rather than the geographically relatively limited pre-emptive strikes against targets in southern Lebanon this morning, Israel would likely expand its operations deeper into Lebanon.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s arsenal has also grown significantly in size since the 2006 war with Israel. With a reported at least 20,000 fighters and perhaps more than 100,000 missiles, it is unlikely that even a full-scale escalation between the two adversaries would be over quickly.
Yet, it will be the Iranian response that will be critical in deciding whether this remains a localised confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah or escalates into a regional war.
Iran promised retaliation following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last month but has yet to carry out its threat. With the Gaza ceasefire negotiations in a deadlock and the humanitarian catastrophe rapidly worsening, Iran has few incentives to delay retaliatory action.
But Tehran does not have any good options left to execute its threatened response – either via proxies or on its own.
Among its once highly capable proxy forces, Palestinian militant group Hamas has been decimated after months of the war in Gaza. The threat of Yemen’s Houthi rebels remains mostly confined to shipping lanes in the Red Sea. And Israel’s pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah this morning is another demonstration that even its best-equipped proxy in the region faces formidable obstacles in causing serious harm to Israel.
The Iranian strikes on Israel in April – of more than 300 drones and missiles but with ultimately little damage– demonstrated capability but not effect. Any similar attack this time is unlikely to deal a devastating blow to Israel and will almost certainly trigger an Israeli military response, and possibly an American one.
It is more likely, in light of Israel’s successful pre-emption this morning that Iran will continue its waiting game. Further escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border will drain Israeli resources and might increase chances of success for a future Iranian attack. The ongoing Gaza war, and the likely human suffering in Lebanon that will follow an escalation on this front, will also further erode Israel’s international standing and make it more difficult for its traditional western partners to continue their support.
The question now is whether the combined Israeli and US military capabilities in the region will be a sufficient deterrent to Iran and its proxies, or whether their combined military might will merely serve as an assurance to Israel that the US will come to its defence in any further escalation.
If it is the former, we may yet avoid an all-out war in the Middle East. If it is the latter, further recklessness on all sides is likely to lead the region further into the abyss.
This is an updated and expanded version of an analysis for Channel News Asia published on 25 August 2024.
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