After 1000 days of Russia's war against Ukraine, negotiations are coming for better or worse
Europe must prepare for a Trump-brokered deal by asserting its own interests.
Since Donald Trump's re-election on November 5, 2024, speculation about the likely shape of deal brokered by the incoming US president, how he would get it done, and what it would mean for Ukraine and its European allies has become frenzied. It is easy to be sceptical of Trump's campaign assertion that he would end the war in 24 hours even before taking office in January 2025, but all the signs clearly point in the direction of a serious diplomatic push to by Trump to force Moscow and Kyiv to agree on a ceasefire and possibly broader settlement. Whatever the outcome of Trump's deal-making, it will have consequences that need to be taken seriously now -- and prepared for.
From a Ukrainian perspective, the implication is that the country would lose currently Russian-occupied territories, at least for the time being, and would have to give up on its aspiration for Nato membership. This is highly unpalatable for Ukraine. However, given recent Russian advances on the front lines in both eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian-held parts of the Kursk region inside Russia, Kyiv can ill-afford a continuation of the war -- especially if Trump follows through on his threat to cut all military support for Ukraine.
The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has acknowledged as much when he said that Kyiv "must do everything so that this war ends next year ... through diplomatic means." This is partly a nod in Trump's direction, indicating Ukraine's willingness to engage in possible US-brokered mediation efforts. To another, not insignificant, part it is also an acceptance that Ukraine's long-term prospects in the war have been bleak for some time, particularly in terms of military leadership, manpower, dependency on western military support and the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure.
In light of Moscow's continuing military momentum, there is some doubt that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is keen to reach a settlement quickly. He has indicated an openness to negotiations, but Russia is known for dragging talks out, introducing additional demands and conditions, and only signing up to an agreement when it has extracted maximum concessions. Even then, meaningful implementation on the ground is hardly a given and re-escalation likely -- as the Minsk accords on Ukraine of September 2014 and February 2015 illustrate only too vividly.
A rarely considered third caveat is that Trump may initially be fully committed to making a deal as he has promised on the campaign trail. Yet, Trump is not known for either patience or attention to detail and could simply abandon a deal if his and Putin's timelines do not align. This was what happened when Trump’s short-lived enthusiasm for an agreement with North Korea's Kim Jong Un during his first time in the White House evaporated, and he simply walked away empty-handed. But even in this case, some negotiations took place, crucially without much concern for US allies like South Korea and Japan. Ultimately, the non-deal between Trump and Kim became one of the factors that enabled further advances in North Korea's nuclear programme and a closer relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Regardless of whether Trump pressures Ukraine into a bad deal, whether Russia defects from Trump-brokered settlement at a later point, or whether Trump abandons his efforts to end the war half-way through, European allies of both Ukraine and the US must plan for the day after Trump's inauguration. This means, above all, taking more responsibility for their own security, as the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, put it succinctly even before the US elections: “the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over”.
Yet, is easier said than done because it is not clear what the trajectory of relations between the key players will be. Several things, however, are clear, and they can provide parameters for European planning now.
First, the bulk of military support for Ukraine will no longer come from the US. Kyiv's European Nato and EU allies will have to do most of the heavy lifting in this regard in the future. This will mean providing financing for purchasing arms and ammunition, initially from the US, and investing long-term in Europe's and Ukraine's defence industrial base.
Second, it means supplying Ukraine in a timely fashion with what it needs. Ukrainian requirements, however, will need to be aligned with a credible military strategy -- not a dreamy victory plan aimed at restoring control over all currently Russian-occupied territories. This became wishful thinking at the moment Ukraine's 2023 counter offensive failed. What is needed is a credible plan to protect those areas Ukraine will control at the time of a ceasefire, along the front lines and Ukrainian airspace. This will ensure some security against future Russian defection from an agreement but also make it more likely that Kyiv-controlled areas can gradually and sustainably be rebuilt, most likely primarily with European funding.
Third, any military strategy to protect Ukraine will also need to serve as a pillar of a future European security order that reigns in, and credibly deters, future Russian adventurism. That is why Kyiv must not be left to its own devices in future negotiations. In a Trump-Putin-Zelensky format of deal-making, Ukraine would be the weakest link and European interests would likely be completely ignored.
This is not to argue for a return to the ill-fated Normandy format of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany that oversaw failed Minsk accords. Rather, if the assumption is that Europe will have to step up and be the main guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty, Kyiv's EU and Nato partners need to have some input in negotiations. The German chancellor's surprise phone call with Putin on November 14, 2024, is an indication that this has been recognised.
A European channel of communication will be important to make clear that there is a common understanding of red lines among European partners and of the consequences if the Kremlin were to cross them -- as well as the benefits if it were to respect them. Both consequences and benefits are linked to the western sanctions regime, a point that was driven home by the November 16 G7 leaders’ statement in support of Ukraine which reaffirmed the "commitment to imposing severe costs on Russia through sanctions".
Europe will therefore also need to work with Trump and have communication channels into his administration. Scholz's phone call with Trump on November 10 was reported as a "very detailed and good conversation", including on Ukraine. European scepticism of Putin as a reliable partner is at odds with Trump's vision of cutting a deal with Putin to "un-unite" Russia and China. A common approach to this conundrum across the Atlantic is possible, but it hinges on a feasible and durable settlement concerning Ukraine.
Such a settlement, too, is possible provided that not only Ukrainian but also wider European interests are reflected in it. The old mantra of "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine" is still valid, but any kind of settlement on Ukraine is also about Europe -- precisely because of Ukraine's aspirations for a European future, the uncertainty over American commitment to transatlantic security and the consequent need for greater European defence autonomy.
After 1000 days of the most devastating military confrontation on European soil since World War II, it is time to accept that nothing about Europe should be without Europe. If it is true that Trump and Putin respect strength and disdain weakness, then the only pathway to getting this point across in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv is through muscular pursuit of European self-interest and self-assertion.
An earlier version of this article was published by The Conversation on 18 November 2024.
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