A wider war in the Middle East is a risky and self-serving bet for Israel
A wider war in the Middle East is a risky and self-serving bet for Israel
Iran demonstrated its ability to strike Israel, and Israel demonstrated its air defence capabilities. Whether both sides can move on depends on their respective calculations.
In response to an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria, Iran launched a massive aerial attack of some 300 drones, cruise missile and ballistic missiles against Israel on Saturday (Apr 13, 2024).
Despite the scale of the attack, little damage was done on the ground. Most of the projectiles were shot down by Israel, with support from the United States, United Kingdom and France, as well as some of Israel’s Arab neighbours, before they even entered Israeli airspace.
The international response was broadly one of condemnation from the West amid an outpour of concern about further escalation and calls for restraint.
Iran demonstrated its ability to strike Israel. In turn, Israel and its allies demonstrated that their air defence capabilities are sufficient to deal with such a large-scale attack. Both sides saved face and could be expected to move on. But will they?
Case Closed for Iran
The likely calculations in Iran and Israel are going to be different and will depend on both domestic and international factors. For now, Iran has indicated that it considers the case closed while also warning that any further Israeli response would elicit a stronger reaction.
One reason for this is that Iran, so far, has been careful not to let things escalate toward a direct confrontation with Israel.
It was only after the unprecedented strike at one of its own diplomatic facilities that the regime in Tehran felt a direct response was required - partly for domestic political reasons of showing resolve and partly for reasons to do with regional power dynamics.
Iran has to navigate a complex set of relationships with regional allies, like Iraq and Syria, proxy forces that include the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Showing apparent weakness by not responding decisively would have potentially damaged Iran’s regional standing and ability to control and direct allies and proxies.
Yet for all the bluster, the Iranian response was comparatively moderate, given that Israel and its allies had plenty of warning once the attack was under way and were thus able to take down 99 per cent of the all the projectiles sent from Iran.
Diminishing Support for Israel
In Israel, the calculations might be different, however. With international support for the country diminishing over its retaliation in Gaza after the Hamas attacks on Oct 7, 2023, the current Israeli government is under pressure both internationally and domestically.
Internationally, the tens of thousands of civilian casualties and the increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Gaza are at the forefront of the criticism of the Netanyahu government from its longstanding allies, in particular the US.
Directly related to the recent tit-for-tat with Iran is also the fear that the different crises across the Middle East could morph into a broader regional conflagration with potential for even wider escalation.
Yet, an escalating conflict that imperils Israel’s existence might also realign regional and global powers in ways that benefit the current Israeli government, diverting attention away from Gaza and supporting Israel in a more direct confrontation with Iran and its allies and proxies. The US’ and G7’s affirmations of their iron-clad commitment to Israel’s right to existence point in that direction.
Domestically, the Israeli government has been under significant pressure for its mishandling of both the initial attacks by Hamas and the subsequent hostage crisis. Any further escalation with Iran would likely have the effect of rallying Israelis around their current government at a moment of existential threat.
Risky Bets
If these were the calculations of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, they would be very risky bets, indeed. It is not at all clear that Israel would be able to fight a multi-front war against a range of highly sophisticated, capable and ruthless enemies at a time when there is little global sympathy left for the country.
Nor is it self-evident that Western support would be available at the level required for Israel to prevail in such a multi-front war, or that its allies, including the US, would be willing to commit to it.
For all the talk about the West’s iron-clad commitment to defending Israel’s right to exist, it is just that: Protecting the country against aggression, not facilitating its current prime minister’s self-serving escalation policy.
Mr Netanyahu and the hardliners in his government would do well to consider how much they have squandered the support that Israel has traditionally enjoyed - and how much more they can risk losing.
This article was initially published by Channel News Asia on 17 April 2024.
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